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The public response to past financial crises has included the creation of one or more special-purpose entities to manage and dispose of assets stripped from the balance sheets of distressed financial firms. In this paper, I present arguments for establishing such an entity-a resolution management corporation (RMC)-as part of the crisis management infrastructure.
Drawing on Kane's principles of asset salvage (1990) and lessons from the nation's experience with special-purpose asset salvors, I lay out the dimensions of an RMC design. Creating an RMC is not a panacea, but properly designed, with the appropriate structure and incentives, it could improve the incentive compatibility of crisis management and resolution. Improperly designed, an RMC could produce distortions resulting in socially sub-optimal crisis resolution, with the prospect of creating moral hazard which, in turn, could increase the frequency and severity of future crises.
This paper begins with a brief history of the U.S. experience with special-purpose assetsalvage operations, including the role of bad banks in asset disposition, with emphasis on the attributes of successful asset-salvage operations. Drawing on the lessons learned from these operations, I propose the creation of a resolution management corporation, making specific recommendations for its design and operation; this proposal emphasizes the importance of accountability and transparency, clarity of mission, and provision of the resources the RMC needs to carry out its mission. Conclusions and policy recommendations appear in the final section.
The history of public and private financial-sector salvage operations
Over the past 80 years, RMC-like entities have been used to rehabilitate financial-sector balance sheets. These asset salvors have run the gamut from the Grant Street Bank (a private bad-bank structure used by Mellon Bank in 1988 to restructure its balance sheet) to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The RFC was an independent government agency, chartered in 1932 to provide emergency financing to distressed banks and other entities and to purchase equities from troubled institutions to recapitalize them and prevent them from failing. 4 See Jones and Angly (1951) for a complete history. Reviews of RFC operations can be found in Todd (1992) and Mason (2000) .
The 1989 Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), established in response to the U.S. savings and loan debacle, occupies a middle ground between bad private banks and public corporations with 3 sweeping asset powers. The RTC engaged in a large-scale, public, asset-salvage operation without the additional powers and responsibilities that had been vested in the RFC. 5 The U.S. is not the only country to establish such a corporation. In 1992, Sweden created two asset management companies, Securum and Retrieva, to salvage the bad assets stripped from the balance sheets of two of the country's largest banks. 6 More recent examples include the use of a bad bank in restructuring WestLB, 7 the German Landesbanken, and the National Asset Management Agency, which was set up to dispose of distressed assets stripped from the balance sheets of Irish banks. 8 By focusing on the U.S. experience with the bad-bank model for specialpurpose asset salvors RFC and RTC, and drawing on Kane's principles for asset salvage (see box 1), I underscore the characteristics of an unconflicted resolution management corporation.
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The role of bad banks in individual cases
The bad banks discussed here are special-purpose asset liquidation corporations, used occasionally to deal with an individual bank's distressed assets. These corporations are smallerscale entities that separate troubled assets from healthy ones in order to facilitate the balance restructuring of a troubled financial institution. They were created with a single clear mission: to maximize the net recovery of the troubled assets deeded to them. Hence, they are likely to follow Kane's principles for asset salvage (see table 1 ).
The first notable use of the bad-bank model took place in 1983, when Bank of America, in a move to expand into the Pacific Northwest, acquired the troubled Seafirst Bank headquartered in Seattle. According to the terms of the deal, Seafirst's shareholders would swap their shares for cash and special-issue Bank of America preferred stock, whose value was tied directly to the performance of a specific pool of distressed assets from Seafirst's balance sheet.
Bank of America agreed to take a first-loss position of $50 million on the pool of assets;
4 additional losses would be charged to the special preferred shares. 10 The concept of a bad bank was formalized in the FDIC's rescue of Continental Illinois
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago in May 1984. As described by Sprague (1986) , the open bank assistance package involved a more formal bad-bank structure. "The permanent assistance package described by [William] Isaac to the press," Sprague wrote, "looked complicated.
Actually, it was just a two-bank maneuver: (1) take out the problem loans and create what amounted to a bad bank for them; and (2) leave the performing loans in the surviving good bank,
Continental."
Much like a deductible on an automobile insurance policy, which better aligns the interests of insurance companies and policy holders, a first-loss position on this pool of assets gave Bank of America an incentive to manage and dispose of them in a way that jointly minimized the loss on these assets and the cost of carrying them.
As in the Seafirst deal, the original Continental shareholders were not completely wiped
out in the open-bank assistance deal. Rather, the value of their claims on the new Continental became a function of the performance of the pool of assets that constituted the bad bank. As with Seafirst, the bad bank was clearly used to allocate the cash flows associated with the distressed assets between the existing shareholders and, in this case, the FDIC.
Seafirst and Continental Illinois exemplify the bad-bank concept in the acquisition and/or rescue of a failing bank, where the bad bank's purpose is to protect the acquirer from uncertain losses on distressed assets. A somewhat novel and more relevant application of the good bank/bad bank structure involves Mellon's 1988 effort to restructure its balance sheet. That plan split the company in two: Mellon, which would retain most of the good assets, and a separately chartered and capitalized Grant Street Bank, which would purchase $1.4 billion of assets from
Mellon's balance sheet at 41 cents on the dollar. 11 10 The events surrounding the failure of Seafirst and its acquisition by Bank of America are described in Sprague (1986), chapter 7.
The creation of Grant Street Bank allowed
Mellon's management to focus on its core businesses by capping its losses at the value of the written-down assets that were purchased by Grant Street Bank, in part through an investment by
Mellon. This two-bank structure provided for effective liquidation of Mellon's troubled assets by 13 Receivership is a form of bankruptcy that involves reorganizing or liquidating a firm. Receivership for insured banks and thrifts is an administrative process, with the FDIC typically being named receiver. Bankruptcy is a judicial process used for nonbank financial firms, with the receiver being named by the bankruptcy court.
Street Bank-were based on the recovery value of the portfolio of bad assets that were stripped from their respective balance sheets, these institutions had strong incentives to pass the assets into the bad bank at their fair market value and in a manner at that preserved their value.
Furthermore, by separating the costs associated with asset management and disposition from the losses embedded in the distressed assets, the bad-bank model provides incentives for efficient asset management and disposition, consistent with Kane's principles for asset salvage (box 1).
Second, these bad banks had a limited, unambiguous mission. They were intended to maximize Clarity of mission is important for aligning incentives, thereby reducing principal-agent conflicts. Kane (1990) shows that the lack of a clear mission and the presence of competing objectives (minimizing the on-budget fiscal impact of losses on failed thrift estates and wellintentioned fair housing goals) reduced the RTC's effectiveness in conducting asset salvage.
Pike and Thomson (1991), Kane (1990) , and the bad-bank experience all point to the need for committing all resources necessary to complete the task, which is the essence of Cassell and
Hoffman's lessons 1 and 8. Another characteristic of bad banks-that they were intended to be limited-life entities-corresponds to Cassell and Hoffman's lesson 9: the need for clear exit strategies. Overall, the lessons from the RTC's experience as a conflicted asset salvor are consistent with those from bad banks.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was created in 1932 as part of the public response to the Great Depression. As described in Jones and Angley (1951) and Todd (1992), the RFC was modeled after the War Finance Corporation, which had been established during World
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War I to provide relief to a wide variety of entities. In addition to aiding state and local governments, the RFC could lend to nearly every sector of the economy, including railroads, banks, agricultural concerns, and businesses. Over time, it became a major contributor to the World War II effort, spending more than $22 billion dollars on procurement and production. The RFC's initial efforts to assist the banking industry through its lending program were unsuccessful because banks were reluctant to borrow and because the fundamental problem plaguing the banking industry was one of solvency, not liquidity.
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In 1933, the RFC's efforts to assist the banking industry shifted from liquidity to solvency support. This policy shift was facilitated by the Emergency Bank Act of 1933, which authorized the RFC to purchase equities from troubled institutions as a means to recapitalize them and prevent them from failing. 21 The FDIC was created later that year by the Glass-Steagall
Act as a longer-term solution to restoring public confidence in financial institutions by insuring their deposits; it also assumed its role of receiver for failed institutions. 22 Following the March 1933 banking holiday, the RFC assessed the solvency of the more than 17,000 institutions that had been closed during the banking holiday. Only 12,000 reopened their doors, and half of these required preferred-stock investments by the RFC for some or all of their capital.
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Capital injections made through the RFC's preferred-stock program were conditioned on an assessment of a bank's viability. That is, the RFC engaged in a large-scale triage program.
Banks deemed to be sound were allowed to reopen. Banks whose assets had a fair value equal to at least 90% of deposits and other liabilities reopened after receiving a capital injection in the form of RFC purchases of preferred stock. A third tier of banks, those whose assets were judged to be worth at least March 31, 2006, 75% of deposits and other liabilities would receive an RFC capital injection in the form preferred stock purchases if their officers and directors could privately raise capital to make up some of the capital shortfall. In the fall of 2008, the U.S. Treasury would follow a similar strategy, using funds from the TARP program to inject government capital, largely by purchasing senior preferred stock. 25 As emphasized earlier, the RFC was a far different operation, with more sweeping powers and responsibilities than bad banks and the more recent RTC. In fact, we focus not on the RFC's asset salvage operations, but rather on those aspects of its structure, operation, and funding that shed light on the transparency and accountability of its operations. Several lessons from the RFC experience may be useful in contemplating the design of an RMC.
Establishing the RFC as a separate entity with its own balance sheet, funded largely by issuing its own debt claims (within limits set by Congress) contributed to its success by facilitating the RFC's transparency and accountability On this point, Todd (1992) observes that "because the RFC's finances were externally constrained, its operations were directly and politically accountable … The external constraint arose from the RFC's incapacity to fund itself off-budget or for a very long time."
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Attributes of an effective resolution management corporation
It is important to note that there is a fine line between using a funding constraint to increase accountability and underfunding the salvor; the latter is inefficient and gives rise to incentive conflicts. and other banking episodes suggest that using forbearance policies to address financial institution failures usually increases the costs to the government and the overall economy. This form of regulatory gambling can delay recognition of the market value of impaired assets and impede 25 Unlike the RFC's preferred-stock purchase program, TARP made capital injections before it evaluated recipients' solvency under the supervisory capital assessment program (the "stress tests") in the spring of 2009. The program is described in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009a, 2009b). 26 An important limit on the RFC was the explicit prohibition against funding its operations directly or indirectly through the Federal Reserve Banks. Such a limit is justified on the following grounds: First, as Todd (1992) notes, the RFC's solvency support, as a fiscal-policy operation, should be kept separate from monetary policy. This restriction is consistent with classic lender-of-last-resort principles, which preclude the use of the Federal Reserve's discount window for purposes other than liquidity support. Second, preventing or limiting the monetization of the RFC's debt improved accountability by requiring explicit authorization by the Congress; this, in turn, subjected the RFC's operations to congressional review. their return to the private sector, thereby increasing the ultimate cost of resolving the firm. In the case of the U.S. savings and loan debacle, Kane and Yu (1995) show how the cost of forbearance rose over the latter half of the 1980s; DeGennaro and Thomson (1996) estimate that regulatory forbearance quadrupled the resolution costs to taxpayers. Therefore, in the wake of systemic financial crises, accounting and capital forbearance emerge as particularly bad policy options because they are likely to extend the duration of the recovery and increase the total costs.
Of all the arguments supporting the establishment of the RMC's asset salvage as part of the crisis management infrastructure, the most compelling may be the need for accountability. A separate entity with a separate balance sheet, able to manage and dispose of distressed assets that come into government hands, provides a structure conducive to transparency and accountability, thereby lessening the potential for principal-agent conflicts. Hence, corporate separateness is not an essential feature of public salvage operations, but rather a means to an end. In the cases of the RFC and RTC, the Congress purposefully chose not to comingle the activities and balance sheets of the special-purpose asset salvor with those of the deposit insurer. The RFC's and RTC's largescale asset-salvage operations were separated from those associated with the FDIC's receivership function; this was likely done to limit the shifting of losses associated with the damaged assets under RFC and RTC management to the FDIC. Losses from banks in the RFC's portfolio could have swamped the FDIC's resources, with negative consequences for the recovery of the banking system. As for the RTC, a separate asset salvor to manage and dispose of damaged assets that came into government hands was created during the resolution of the 1980s thrift debacle, partly to prevent losses from failed thrift estates from shifting onto the banking industry. However, keeping a public salvage operation at arm's length from the deposit insurer does not guarantee that its incentives will be properly aligned, as illustrated by Kane's (1990) analysis of the RTC's principal-agent conflicts. After all, the RTC's operations more than met the arms-length condition.
Accountability is supported by transparency. Restoring credit flows to a fragile financial system requires a transparent asset-disposition process. The goal of this phase of the recovery is to quickly return assets to the private sector at maximum recovery values, while maintaining a complete accounting of all losses to ensure the transparency necessary to restore market confidence. Failure to recognize losses quickly and to account for them fully led to problems in borrowers to forestall the recognition of losses, which was a major factor in Japan's decade-long anemic recovery.
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For the most part, the RMC's acquisitions should be limited to assets from institutions that have passed through a receivership process. Purchases from operating financial institutions should be limited to assets for which market values can be established; further, sellers should be required to include warrants on their stock, with values contingent on losses from the assets sold to the RMC. The RMC should be prohibited from paying more for a distressed asset than the price it received (if such a price is available) from the sale of an equivalent asset. Finally, all of the RMC's assets must be carried at fair market value. First, delay in returning assets to the private sector can increase total resolution costs because these assets may deteriorate while in the government's hands, particularly if the asset salvor lacks the expertise and/or incentives to maintain and enhance the value of troubled assets on its books. The concept of an expiration date is also consistent with Cassell and Hoffmann's lesson on the need for the government to have exit strategies. Hence, the RMC's charter should remain active only as long as is necessary to carry out its mission, with a maximum duration of 10 years.
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To ensure effective yet incentive-compatible operations, the RMC should be given a revolving line of credit with the U.S. Treasury. The credit line should be large enough to fund the RMCs operations during its start-up period; one suggested amount is $100 billion. The RMC would draw on this credit line for working capital and short-term funding for its operations, particularly during its first six months.
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29 Todd (1992) notes that over time, the RFC's operations became politicized; hence, one lesson from that experience is the need to limit the duration of any RFC-like entity created in response to a financial crisis.
The liquidity provided by the Treasury credit line will 30 Central banks' independence is often viewed as means to resolve short-run conflicts between their missions: to provide for price stability as well as high employment. Independence is thought to allow a central bank to focus on the long term, where these dual objectives do not conflict. Alesina and Summers (1993) find a significantly positive relationship between measures of a central bank's independence and its inflation performance. 31 Properly viewed as a fiscal responsibility, the cost of resolving a financial crisis should not be funded by the central bank, directly or indirectly. To insulate the lender-of-last resort and monetary-policy functions of the central bank from the solvency and asset disposition activities of the RMC, the latter should be prohibited from borrowing from the central bank.
allow the RMC to more effectively engage in rescue, that is, to acquire assets in a manner that preserves their value and reduces losses associated with (at best) benign neglect in insolvent institutions. Within six months of activation, the RMC should be required to seek permanent operational funding in two forms: direct congressional appropriations sufficient to cover operating costs and issuance of RMC bonds with a maximum maturity of 10 years. As a government agency, albeit a temporary one, the RMC's bonds would carry the full faith and credit of the United States. Hence, its charter should include authorization to issue bonds up to a predetermined limit, say $700 billion. Activation of its charter should be accompanied by an assessment its borrowing needs and a request to Congress for additional bond issuance authority if needed. The principal and interest on the bonds would be funded through the liquidation of the RMC's assets. Because assets should be acquired at fair value, little or no additional funding should be required to cover shortfalls in the value of assets sold. Requiring the RMC to seek additional appropriations to cover unexpected asset losses should reduce its incentives to overpay for distressed assets, and limits on the maturity of its debt should provide incentives for timely asset disposition. William Seidman was also the RTC's chairman. In addition, the FDIC's receivership function was explicitly part of the RTC's exit strategy; the remaining assets in the RTCs portfolio were passed on to the FDIC in 1995, just one year before the RTC's charter expired.
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The alternative to housing the RMC in an agency separate from the FDIC is to make it an independent, operating subsidiary of the FDIC. Such an arrangement could produce the same level of transparency and accountability as complete corporate separateness, provided that the balance sheets of the FDIC's deposit insurance operations remain separate from those of the RMC.
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The RMC and Crisis Management
An example of this is the once-separate deposit guarantee funds for banks and thrifts.
Prior These activities increase the likelihood that the regulatory response to an emerging financial crisis minimizes the short-run fiscal costs of crisis management activities as well as the long-run costs associated with time-inconsistent crisis management options. Whether an independent federal corporation chartered by Congress or an FDIC subsidiary, the RMC should be established as a shelf corporation in the sense that its charter, funding authority, and authorization for staffing and other resources would be in place, but the RMC would remain dormant until activated by a financial crisis or systemic banking crisis. The process for activating the RMC 32 Practical concerns, such as the RMC's need for access to experts in asset disposition, provide a rationale for making the RMC a subsidiary of the FDIC. In fact, Davison (2005) argues that the RTC would have been much more difficult to create had it not been able to draw on the FDIC's expertise.
should be auditable and accountable because activating it routinely to deal with higherfrequency, lower-cost banking and financial market disruptions could have unintended consequences. Its activation should be conditioned on the declaration of a financial crisis using a process similar to that which the FDIC must follow to invoke the systemic risk exemption to least-cost resolution involving the FDIC's board, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
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Conclusions and policy recommendations
The aftermath of a financial crisis offers central bankers, financial regulators, and economists important opportunities to study the causes of the crisis, reflect on lessons that can be learned, and consider reforms that reduce the likelihood of recurrence. Financial crises impose both fiscal and economic costs, and the response to a crisis can increase or decrease those costs substantially. Today's response starts us down the path toward more-or fewer-crises in the future.
Systemic banking and financial crises introduce the risk of material losses, which can be mitigated by a rapid, transparent response that restores credit flows and market confidence.
While the FDIC is effective in responding to higher-frequency, smaller-scale banking system problems, it was not designed to respond to a systemic crisis. Such a crisis invariably requires the marshalling of resources beyond those normally available to the deposit guarantor; this suggests the need for a mechanism to effectively address the large volume of distressed assets that characteristically accompany a crisis. The financial crisis of 2007-09 highlights the need for financial-institution regulators to develop contingency plans for dealing with a financial or systemic banking crisis and to conduct mock disaster exercises in response to various scenarios.
These contingency plans must also include provisions for the necessary crisis-management infrastructure, including creation of a separate distressed-asset management and salvage operation, the RMC.
To optimize its effectiveness in responding to a financial crisis, the RMC should be an independent federal agency chartered by Congress and tasked with management and salvage of distressed assets. It should be activated as part of the response to a financial or systemic banking 33 Section 13(C)(4)(G) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
crisis and should remain in operation only as long as needed. Lessons from previous uses of dedicated public and private asset-disposition corporations suggest that several factors should be taken into account in designing the RMC: It should have a clear, focused mission; access to sufficient resources, including funding, personnel, and dedicated administrative resources to carry out its mission; and operational transparency, including regularly published financial statements and routine audits by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, to ensure accountability that could be further strengthened through congressional oversight.
The scope of the RMC's asset-salvage operations should be defined as part of the process of activating it and should be validated by Congress. The RMC's permanent funding could consist of any combination of the following: direct appropriation by Congress, a line of credit from the U.S. Treasury, and direct issue of debt in private financial markets. The Federal
Reserve should be prohibited from funding the RMC, either directly or indirectly. Once its charter has been activated, the RMC's activities should be limited to asset management and salvage operations as part of the crisis management infrastructure that resolves insolvencies; its charter as an active government corporation should be effective only as long as is necessary to carry out its mission, but no longer than 10 years. As part of a comprehensive approach to managing crises, an effective RMC can promote a timely response and reduce the painful losses these events typically impose.
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Box 1: Kane's Principles for Unconflicted Asset Salvage * According to Kane (1990) , this means that the public salvor-the entity charged with maximizing net recovery on these assets-needs to be proficient in
• rescue (peril reduction)
• appraisal (damage evaluation, that is, documenting and valuing inventories of damaged goods)
• property management (efficiently protecting and enhancing existing value)
• sales (searching out potential buyers, communicating appraisal information to them, and running auctions or bargaining for the best price)
Moreover, for effective asset salvage, the public salvor must have access to experts in each core activity as well as experts on the specific types of assets that come under its supervision.
*(Kane (1990, pages 756-57).
